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This study empirically investigates the cost-effectiveness of different agri-environmental policy 
instruments. We compare the Environment Stewardship Scheme (ESS) as an example for a 
management agreement type instrument, to the Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZ) as an example for a 
command-and-control type instrument. Both instruments are currently applied in the UK. Based on a 
simple cost model considering also relevant transaction costs and risk we use different regression and 
resampling techniques to estimate the marginal effects of different factors with respect to the 
instruments‟ relative cost-effectiveness and to identify factors for cost variation over space and time. 
We control for the actual level of compliance by using compliance weighted average scheme cost 
ratios. The findings suggest that the ESS instrument has a higher cost-effectiveness whereas the NVZ 
instrument is more expensive on a general level. However, if the focus is on compliance weighted 
cost ratios, the picture changes somewhat. Further, we find a significant regional variation in the cost-
effectiveness for both instruments as well as a significant variation over time. 
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Policies to encourage the provision of agri-environmental goods have been introduced and 
developed since the 1980s as a consequence of rising concerns that agricultural support measures 
have led to a threatening level of land use intensity. Following standard economic theory, such 
agri-environmental goods (e.g. water quality or biodiversity) are unlikely to be provided through a 
market mechanism at their socially optimal levels because of externalities as well as the public 
good nature of the targeted goods. However, market based policy instruments are generally 
considered as a more cost-effective way to achieve environmental goals compared with command-
and-control based policy instruments. The overall aim of this study is to empirically investigate the 
costs and effects of a management agreement type agri-environmental instrument and compare 
them to the cost and effects of a command-and-control agri-environmental instrument. 
Quantitative evaluations of alternative agri-environmental policy instruments need to include 
beside the actual payments to farmers also various types of transaction costs to increase the 
efficiency of policy choice and the sustainability of policy design (Falconer et al. 2001, McCann et 
al. 2005). Transparency with respect to the factors that cause schemes to be more or less costly to 
run would enable policy-makers to identify possible adjustments to improve the efficiency of these 
schemes. Relative inefficiency of instruments can be caused by factors related to policy 
management characteristics but also by factors related to recipients‟ characteristics. The latter 
comprises beside individual characteristics as e.g. risk considerations, also such characteristics 
related to production as well as prevailing environmental conditions. We first use the case of the 
Environmental Stewardship Scheme (ESS) currently in operation in the UK. Here agricultural 
producers agree to modify their production activities to benefit the environment and are 
compensated for the costs they so incur. Second, we consider the case of the Nitrate Vulnerable 
Zone Scheme (NVZ) as a command-and-control type instrument. The Nitrate Pollution Prevention 
                                                 
 This research has been completed when the first author was an ESRC funded research fellow in the Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs, London, UK (ESRC: RES-173-27-0097). The authors are grateful for comments and help from a number 
of colleagues, in particular Simon Harding, Steve Chaplin, Nigel Crane, Tony Pike, Charles Mbakwe and Andrew Woodend. The 
views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily of DEFRA. The authors are also grateful to various participants 
in different academic seminars (especially to Nick Hanley and John Rolfe). Errors remain the authors‟ own responsibility. Regulations 2008 have been introduced to implement the EU‟s Nitrates Directive and to reduce 
nitrogen losses from agriculture to water. Areas where nitrate pollution is a problem are designated 
as NVZ and rules are set for certain farming practices to be followed in these zones. 
We control for the actual level of compliance per region by using compliance weighted average 
scheme cost ratios. Beside technological and economic performance measures, we also consider 
proxies for risk at farm level. By this we go further than existing studies on ecosystem services 
schemes and aim to empirically investigate the theoretically well explored policy implications of 
adverse selection and moral hazard. The next section discusses the economics of a management-
agreement-type and a command-and-control type instrument followed by section 3 introducing the 
different costs and effects related to policy measures in general and agri-environmental 
instruments in particular. Section 4 describes the Environmental Stewardship Scheme and the 
Nitrate Vulnerable Zone Scheme operated in the UK. The empirical methodology is outlined in 
section 5, followed by the exposition and discussion of the estimation results (section 6). Section 7 
formulates policy implications and concludes. 
 
II) Agri-Environmental Instruments 
Considering instruments of economic policy at a very general level, economic instruments can 
be distinguished from traditional command-and-control instruments (see Hepburn 2006). In the 
area of agri-environmental policy economic instruments for conservation purposes (as e.g. market-
based mechanisms such as eco-certification) are usually subsumed under the heading of payments 
for environmental services (PES). Following Wunder (2005) and Pagiola et al. (2007), payment 
schemes for environmental services generally have two common features: (1) they are voluntary 
agreements, and (2) participation involves a management contract (or agreement) between the 
conservation agent and the landowner. The latter agrees to manage an ecosystem according to 
agreed-upon rules (e.g. reducing fertiliser usage or stocking rates, or providing a public good by 
fencing to exclude stock from remnant bush) and receives a payment (in-kind or cash) conditional 
on compliance with the contract. Such contractual relationships are subject to asymmetric 
information between landowners and conservation agents. 
Information asymmetries in the design of such contracts relate to hidden information and 
hidden action. Hidden information (leading to adverse selection) arises when the service contract 
is negotiated: Landowners hide information about their opportunity cost structure with respect to 
supplying the environmental service and, hence, are able to claim higher costs of provision and 
finally higher payments. Hidden information has been the subject of numerous theoretical analyses 
in the context of agri-environmental payment schemes (see e.g. Spulber 1988, Chambers 1992, Fraser 1995, Wu and Babcock 1996, Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort 1997, Moxey et al 
1999, Ozanne et al 2001, Peterson and Boisvert 2004, Ozanne and White 2008). Hidden action (or 
moral hazard) arises after the contract has been negotiated leading to costly monitoring and 
enforcement in the case of non-compliance on the side of the conservation agent. The agent might 
not be able to perfectly monitor and/or enforce compliance or might choose not to monitor and/or 
enforce compliance. Hence, the landowner has an incentive to avoid the fulfillment of the 
contractual responsibilities and to seek rent through non-compliance (see e.g. White 2002, Fraser 
2002 and 2004, Hart and Latacz-Lohmann 2005, Ozanne and White 2008, Yano and Blandford 
2009, Zabel and Roe 2009). 
Compliance 
Economists usually model the compliance decision of a firm or farm as a choice under risk with 
monitoring being essentially a random process (see e.g. Heyes 1998). Let us suppose that there 
exists some regulation (e.g. the requirements by a conservation contract) requiring a farm or 
landowner to execute action a (e.g. to reduce the use of chemicals on a particular piece of land). If 
the cost to comply with that regulation for farm i is ci, the probability of non-compliance being 
detected is , and the penalty for non-compliance is p, then a profit-maximising and risk neutral 
farm will comply if and only if 
                             (1) 
or 
                               (2) 
Those farms that find 
                                (3) 
where ti denotes a farm specific treshold, will comply and execute action a. The rest will take 
the risk of being caught and fined with p. However, what matters in environmental and hence 
policy terms is the compliance rate across all farms taking part in the agri-environmental scheme j, 
say j. Farms differ with respect to ci and ti reflecting differences in managerial skills, technology, 
location but also individual attitudes and experiences. If c is distributed according to some 
cumulative distribution F(ci), then the compliance rate across all farms taking part in the scheme, 
j, can be expressed as a function of the enforcement policy parameters 
                               (4) 
By raising  - the probability that non-compliance will be penalized - and/or raising p - the size 
of the penalty - compliance becomes more attractive to the farm and so j increases. The 
magnitude of such an increase (i.e. the effectiveness of a raise in  and/or p) will depend on the 
shape of F. Assuming social disutility as the sum of the unweighted sum of all AES scheme costs and environmental damage, compliance decisions will be firstbest if and only if the product p 
happens to equal the marginal expected environmental damage caused by non-compliance. For any 
given scheme population compliance rate j  the distribution of compliance effort between farms is 
efficient - as it is always those farms with the lowest compliance cost ci that do comply (Heyes 
1998). Hence, the conservation agent maximizes compliance (i.e. minimizing environmental 
damage) by setting both  and p as high as possible. Full compliance is only ensured if p exceeds 
the upper bound of c. In most cases, however, this will not be possible because of budgetary, 
legislative and other constraints. In a more realistic setting, the compliance decision faced by each 
farm is continuous in character, i.e. a farmer will typically have to choose a level of compliance, 
i.e. a level of action a (e.g. reducing the use of chemicals ch on a particular piece of land) which is 
inherently continuous variable.
i Farm i is subject to a regulatory standard which forbids it from 
using input chi beyond some level s. Assume that the expected penalty for exceeding the level s is 
an increasing function p(chi – s) of the size of the violation and compliance costs are increasing 
according to a function c(chi). Then the farm i has to choose a level of input to minimize  
                                     (5) 
The first-order condition provides the solution chi* 
      
            
                        (6) 
The farm uses the detrimental input up to the point at which the marginal cost (i.e. foregone 
profit) of further decreasing input ch equals the marginal saving in terms of expected penalties. 
The size of the violation depends only on the marginal, not the average properties of the expected 
penalty function which is the essential message of the „theory of marginal deterrence‟ (e.g. Shavell 
1992, Stavins 1996). 
Ozanne et al (2001) find that the moral hazard problem can be eliminated if monitoring costs 
are negligible or fixed, or farmers are highly risk averse. Optimal monitoring effort declines with 
increasing farmer risk aversion. Fraser (2002) shows that risk averse farmers who face uncertainty 
in their production income are more likely to comply with agri-environmental schemes as a means 
of risk management. Peterson and Boisvert (2004) propose a method to accommodate asymmetric 
information on farmers‟ risk preferences in designing voluntary environmental policies. By 
incorporating stochastic efficiency rules in a mechanism design problem, the conservation agent 
could find incentive-compatible policies by knowing only the general class of risk preferences 
among the farmers. By introducing uncertainty about farmer characteristics into the moral hazard 
problem Hart and Latacz-Lohmann (2005) find, that if farmers are overwhelmingly honest then the 
regulator reduces monitoring and accepts that some dishonest farmers will escape undetected. 
Ozanne and White (2008) analyse the design of agri-environmental schemes for risk-averse producers whose input usage is only observable by costly monitoring. They conclude that if the 
scheme is designed in such a way that producers always comply with an input quota, risk aversion 
is not relevant in determining the level of input use. Heyes (1998) and others note a particular 
empirical regularity with respect to the compliance of firms which is referred to as the „Harrington 
paradox‟: Firms appear to over-comply - to comply more fully and/or more frequently than would 
be suggested by consideration of the private costs and benefits of so doing. Alternative rationales 
for such an irrational compliance behaviour can be found in the literature: (i) voluntary 
compliance, (ii) misjudgement, (iii) penalty leverage, or (iv) regulatory dealing. Hence, there is 
scope for the agency to exploit „issue-linkage‟ and farms may appear to over-comply in a given 
setting, but in reality are so doing in exchange for the agency „turning a blind eye‟ somewhere 
else. 
Risk 
As summarized above, different studies on environmental services and agri-environmental 
policy schemes point to the relevance of risk for the landowner‟s decision to comply with the 
scheme‟s requirements. More detailed studies show that there is a functional link between the 
individual farmer‟s attitude towards production risk (due to input, output, technology, or market 
factors), his compliance behaviour, and the monitoring and enforcement costs of the conservation 
agency (Peterson and Boisvert 2004, Zabel and Roe 2009). The general notion is that the higher 
the risk aversion of the farmer and the higher the uncertainty faced with respect to his production 
income, the lower the costs for the conservation agency. Knowledge about farmers‟risk 
preferences leads to lower agency costs via more effective scheme design based on targeted 
compliance incentives. 
  We assume that risk averse farmers participating in scheme j utilize a vector of inputs x to 
produce an output q through a technology described by a well-behaved - continuous and twice 
differentiable - production function f(). Beside price risk, the individual farmer is assumed to incur 
production risk as crop and livestock yields and product quality might be affected by external 
environmental random variations but also by technology underperformance or failure. Such risk 
can be considered as being part of the random variable  ε with its distribution H() which is 
exogenously determined. Scheme participants can be assumed to be price-takers in both the input 
and output markets as the relevant scheme usually targets a relatively small and homogenous 
geographic area and hence factor price variability is low (Huffmann and Mercier 1991). Farmers in 
Europe further face minimum guaranteed output prices still regulated by the different commodity 
regimes of the EU Common Agricultural Policy. As outlined above farm i is subject to a 
regulatory standard which forbids it from using a detrimental input chi beyond some level s. The efficiency of input ch use critically depends on the utilized technology and can be captured by 
incorporating a function ψ() in the production function q = f[ψ()xch, x] where   is a vector of 
heterogeneous farm and farmer characteristics. Following Kountouris et al (2006) based on Antle 
(1983 and 1987), the risk averse farmer maximises the expected utility of profit   described by 
(7) 
                            ∫{                                 }        (7) 
where U() is the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, and p and r as the non-random 
output and input prices respectively. The first-order condition for the detrimental input choice is 
given by 
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with  ' ( )/ UU    and with the first term on the right-hand side denoting the expected marginal 
product of the detrimental input, and the second term measuring deviations from risk-neutral 
behaviour in the case of assumed risk-aversion (Antle 1987). Hence, risk faced by the farmer and 
his risk related behaviour affects his cost of compliance ci via the vector of technological 
characteristics tech including the farmer‟s choices regarding the detrimental input chi. 
Consequently, empirical knowledge about farmer i’s risk preferences leads to lower agency costs 
via more effective scheme design based on targeted compliance incentives for farmer i (see also 
Peterson and Boisvert 2004). 
 
III) Costs of Agri-Environmental Schemes 
Several studies aim to shed empirical light on the performance of voluntary agreement type 
agri-environmental schemes, especially with respect to the relative financial efficiency or cost-
effectiveness of such instruments. Whitby and Saunders (1996) compare two such agreements for 
the UK on the basis of transaction costs and public expenditures and estimate supply curves based 
on cost per hectare ratios. McCann and Easter (1999) measure the magnitude of transaction costs 
associated with different policies to reduce agricultural nonpoint source pollution by using staff 
interviews to disentangle the instruments‟ transaction costs. Falconer and Whitby (2000) 
investigate factors for scheme administration costs at EU level and try to indicate potential for 
implementation cost savings. They conclude that downward pressure on costs over time may stem 
from economies of scale and experience. Falconer et al (2001) aim to estimate administrative cost 
functions to investigate factors affecting the magnitude of such costs. They find that the extent of 
participation is important in explaining administrative cost variability across space. Further economies of size were found with respect to the number of agreements and a significant effect of 
scheme experience. McCann et al (2005) provide a systematic treatment of transaction cost 
definition and measurement as well as make recommendations regarding a typology of costs and 
potential measurement methodologies. 
Transaction Costs 
  Coase (1960) was the first to relate the concept of transaction costs to environmental policy 
evaluation. Different other authors note that the magnitude of such transaction costs involved with 
eliminating externalities is affected by the number and diversity of agents, available technology, 
type of instrument, the size of the transaction, and the institutional environment (e.g. Vatn and 
Bromley 1994, Stavins 1995, Challen 2000, Vatn 1998 and 2001). McCann and Easter (1999) note 
that in order to be incorporated in policy evaluation, transaction costs must be measured. The 
literature suggests that transaction costs of environmental policies are likely to be significant.
ii 
Although the magnitudes of transaction costs associated with environmental and natural resource 
policies are demonstrably important (Kuperan et al. 1998, Falconer et al. 2001), few studies to date 
have attempted to actually quantify transaction costs. Numerous definitions of transaction costs are 
available in the literature. As we aim to evaluate policy instruements, we define the term 
transaction costs as including administrative costs (see also Stiglitz 1986, McCann et al 2005). 
Based on Allen (1991) and McCann et al (2005) we define transaction costs as resources used to 
design, establish, maintain, and transfer property rights. 
Different types of costs may be borne by different conservation agencies or at different points 
in the policy instrument‟s life cycle. Different types of policy instruments may entail a different 
mix of costs or a difference in the costs‟ relative importance. A number of transaction cost 
typologies exist in the literature (Dahlman 1979, Stiglitz 1986, Foster and Hahn 1993, Thompson 
1999), however, any relevant framework has to be general enough to include both market and 
nonmarket policy instruments (Coase 1960). McCann et al (2005) based on Thompson (1999) 
present a general typology of transaction cost components associated with public policies: (1) 
research, information gathering, and analysis associated with defining the problem; (2) design and 
implementation of the policy; (3) enactment of enabling legislation, including lobbying and public 
participation costs; (4) contracting costs, which may include additional information costs, 
bargaining costs, and decision costs, which are relevant when a market has been set up for a 
natural resource; (5) support and administration of the ongoing program; (6) monitoring/detection, 
which may include both the monitoring of the environmental outcome, or the level of compliance 
with the regulation, tax/subsidy scheme, or private contract, as well as the development of 
monitoring technologies; and (7) prosecution/ enforcement/inducement/conflict resolution costs incurred if lack of compliance is found; (8) scheme analysis and (9) scheme revision. The total 
costs of an agri-environmental scheme include beside these transaction costs also the actual 
compensation payments made to the farmers taking part in the scheme. So far there is no 
contribution which empirically investigates the link between instruments‟ costs and farmers‟ 
behaviour, farms‟ technological characteristics and spatial differences. Existing quantitative 
studies on the cost-effectiveness of agri-environmental schemes consider only scheme related 
factors and neglect variation over farmer behaviour, farm types and space.
iii
 
A Simple Management Scheme Cost Model 
  Let TC denote the sum of scheme j related transaction cost components - fixed and variable 
costs for the set-up (SU), administration (A), monitoring (M), and scheme evaluation (E) for the 
time period t = 1, ...., T: 
        ∑                              
                  (9) 
The total scheme costs SC (or exchequer relevant costs) for scheme j in year t comprises 
compensatory payments CP and the sum of transaction costs TC and is a function of scheme 
related factors sc and factors related to scheme j’s farmers‟ compliance behaviour c 
             (    )        (        )                           (10) 
Farmers‟ costs of compliance c are a function of managerial skills (m), technological 
characteristics (tech), spatial differences (l) but also individual attitudes and experiences (att). 
Scheme related factors are such related to the area under agreement (aagr), the number of 
agreements (nagr), the scheme age (st), other scheme specific characteristics (z), and potential 
overlap of the covered area with other agri-environmental instruments target area (in). Abstracting 
from j and t, we obtain 
                                                  (11) 
The vector of technological characteristics (i.e. input/output levels and interactions) includes also 
the choices with respect to detrimental inputs (as e.g. chemicals, fertilizer), labor input allocation 
to the production of different outputs including beside marketed outputs also the ecosystem service 
compensated by the scheme, and land use decisions. To elicitate proxies for these technological 
characteristics and performance measures a multi-output framework can be used. To obtain 
estimates of the production structure and performance of each farm participating in the scheme we 
rely on a transformation function model representing the most output producible from a given 
input base and existing conditions, which also represents the feasible production set. This function 
in general form can be written as 0=F(Y,X,C), where Y is a vector of outputs (marketed and 
ecosystem services), X is a vector of inputs (including also detrimental inputs), and C is a vector of (external) shift variables, which reflects the maximum amount of outputs producible from a 
given input vector and external conditions. The model can be described as:  
                                              (12) 
where the subscript P denotes the primary output of farm i at time t. By adding Vit as a vector of 
random errors following iid N(0, sv
2), and Uit ~N(mit, su
2) as a vector of inefficiency terms (see 
Battese and Coelli 1995) a transformation frontier is obtained. The empirical estimation of (12) 
yields an efficiency estimate per farm and year (effit) to approximate the farmers‟ input k and 
output S choices as well as his cost of compliance with scheme j. Following the discussion above, 
to obtain valid proxies for the farmers‟ specific production risk we can describe a profit function 
for each farm i at time t. Hence, profit per farm and year   as a function of variable input prices R 
(including also prices of detrimental inputs), relevant output prices P, and a vector of extra profit 
shifters C as well as an iid error term V: 
                          (13) 
The estimated moments (o) of the profit function in (13) can be used as proxies for the individual 
farmer‟s production risk and deliver empirical evidence on his risk related behaviour, hence, also 
his compliance behaviour with scheme j’s contractual requirement. If the total scheme costs SC for 
scheme j and year t are compared to the total scheme costs SC for scheme j in year t+1 differences 
in the scheme‟s overall rate of compliance have to be considered. This can be done by weighting 
the total scheme costs by the rate of compliance in the specific year (SCc) 
                                 (14) 
To make inferences at the relevant administrative scheme level (i.e. to adequately reflect budget 
authority) we consider the scheme costs e.g. at the regional (i.e. subnational) level (gor) 
                                       (15) 
Finally, to consider the environmental effects side of the scheme - in terms of a cost-effectiveness 
type perspective - we can use a proxy for the sum of environmental effects per space unit (e.g. per 
ha land covered) and re-write our total scheme cost function as an average scheme cost function or 
scheme cost per ha function 
 
   
                                      (16) 
A Simple Command-and-Control Cost Model 
  For the command-and-control type policy instrument we slightly modify the previously 
outlined cost model (equations 9 to 16). Hence, as no compensatory payments are relevant in this 
case equation (10) is to be modified 
             (        )                             (17) where the total scheme costs SC (or exchequer relevant costs) for instrument j in year t comprises 
only the sum of transaction costs TC and is again a function of instrument related factors sc and 
factors related to instruments j’s farmers‟ compliance behaviour c. The rest of the notation is 
equivalent to those outlined above. Furthermore the estimation of production structure and risk 
related parameters will follow the procedures outlined above. Finally, the consideration of average 
instrument costs and environmental effects are defined along the explanations above for the 
conservation scheme. 
IV) Empirical Cases 
The Environmental Stewardship Scheme (ESS) in the UK 
  The need for society to engage farmers in conservation activities has been officially 
acknowledged in the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) since the beginning of the 1990s. 
The McSharry reform in 1992 led to the widespread implementation of agri-environmental 
measures in the CAP. Since then, voluntary agri-environmental schemes have become a key policy 
instrument for conserving and enhancing the environment. Agri-environmental schemes (AES) 
have become the dominant instrument of EU agri-environmental policy (Latacz-Lohmann and 
Hodge 2003), with EU expenditure on agri-environmental measures increasing to more than EUR 
2 billion in 2005 and agri-environmental contracts covering more than a quarter of the EU-25 
utilized agricultural area (European Commission 2008). The UK Environmental Stewardship 
Scheme (ESS) has been launched in mid 2005 and replaces the previous UK agri-environment 
schemes. It consists of an entry-level (ELS) and a higher-level (HLS) scheme, whereas the entry-
level scheme has also an organic strand (map 1). The ESS is an example of the „wide-and-shallow‟ 
approach replacing the more targeted schemes that were in place since the mid eighties (Dobbs and 
Pretty 2004 and 2008, Defra 2005). As part of the Environmental Stewardship Scheme, 
agricultural producers agree to modify their production activities to benefit the environment and 
are compensated for the costs they so incur. Most modifications imply a reduction in the intensity 
of production and the loss is usually conceived as income foregone by profit-maximizing 
producers. The level of compensation offered must be sufficient to persuade producers to forgo 
production options and to replace the income they lose. 
   Map 1 - Geographical Variation in ELS Uptake 
 
(Based on Chaplin 2009 and Farm Business Survey 2008, JCA: Joint Classification Area) 
 
The Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZ) in the UK 
The Nitrate Pollution Prevention Regulations 2008 have been introduced to implement the ECs 
Nitrates Directive and to reduce nitrogen losses from agriculture to water. Areas where nitrate 
pollution is a problem are designated - known as Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZs). Rules are set 
for certain farming practices to be followed in these zones. In 2006 the agricultural area designated 
as NVZs has been increased to about 68% (see map 2). The owner or occupier of any land or 
holding within an NVZ is responsible for complying with the rules whereas the Environment 
Agency is responsible for assessing farmers‟ compliance with these regulations, accomplished by 
random farm visits. Compliance with these rules is a requirement for cross compliance under SPS. 
Nitrate Vulnerable Zones rules concerning e.g. the storage of organic manures, the limiting of 
livestock manure, the planning of nitrogen use, the limiting of N requirements with respect to crop 
production, the management of spreading periods for organic manures and manufactured fertiliser, 
the nitrogen impact on surface water, and different field application techniques. 
Different studies aim to evaluate the environmental effects of the NVZ programme (see Defra 
2007). However, economic costs and effects are included only at the sectoral level in these studies. 
In contrast to this practise we focus the direct set-up and operating costs of the NVZ instrument. 
E.g. ADAS (2007) comprehensively estimates the final environmental effects of the NVZ 
instrument by covering in detail the nutrient content of manure, the pollutant losses, and the 
livestock manure N loadings. We conclude, that the final environmental effects can not 
satisfactorily be separated from other instruments‟ environmental effects with respect to the nitrate 
pollution reduction policy goal. This appears even more difficult if these effects should be covered 
Map 2 - Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZ) 
 
(Based on ADAS 2007) 
 on a regional basis and/or in a dynamic perspective, e.g. on annual basis. We therefore use a proxy 
for the final environmental effects on a more aggregated level, i.e. the utilised agricultural area 
covered by instrument (per region and year). However, we note that the implied assumption is that 
the final environmental effect is the same per ha for the different instruments over time and space. 
 
V) Data and Empirical Methodology 
  By empirically investigating the cost models outlined above, we aim to contribute to the 
literature in the following ways: There are still only a very few empirical studies available 
investigating the performance of environmental policy instruments using microdata at the farm 
level. We control for the actual level of compliance per region by using compliance weighted 
average scheme cost ratios. Beside technological and economic performance measures, we also 
consider proxies for risk at farm level. By this we go further than existing studies on 
environmental instruments and schemes and aim to empirically investigate the theoretically well 
explored policy implications of adverse selection and moral hazard. In addition we consider 
unobserved heterogeneity or path dependency with respect to unknown spatial and farm specific 
factors. 
Data 
  In contrast to earlier studies we were able to obtain annual data on the different transaction cost 
components with respect to all full years (2006 to 2008) the ESS scheme is in operation. Whereas 
the data on the conservation payments is at regional level, parts of the cost data are only available 
at the national level. Hence some weighted proxies are necessary to obtain cost data at the 
administratively relevant level of government office regions in England (i.e. East Midlands, East 
of England, London, North East, North West, South East, South West, West Midlands, Yorkshire 
and Humberside). The cost data as well as weighting procedures are based on staff 
communications and interviews (at Defra, Natural England and The Environment Agency) as well 
as internally recorded scheme performance data, hence, consists of expert informed proxies and 
calculations. We use the share of agreements including nitrate relevant ESS options as a weight to 
build cost proxies at the regional level for the ESS scheme. To reflect also the effects side of the 
instruments we further divide the cost by the total area under the scheme for region g to obtain 
cost-effect or average cost ratios per ha area covered per region. Finally, to adequately reflect the 
actual area under the scheme - i.e. adjusting for non-compliance by weighting the area under 
agreement by the recorded compliance rate per region and year - we build compliance weighted 
cost-effect or average cost ratios per ha area covered per region. As the number of regions and 
years indicate a likely small sample bias we bootstrap the descriptive statistics to obtain evidence on the robustness of the sample statistics. By using such scheme cost data we overcome data 
limitations faced by earlier studies with respect to the number of agreement enquiries that failed to 
result in a signed management agreement, the area entered into different options, the geographical 
diffusion of participating farmers, and their attitudes and risk exposure as well as compliance 
behaviour per region and year. Hence, our cost data reflects the actual administrative effort to be 
required for efficient scheme running to a large degreee as this depends on how well farmer 
participation and administrative resource needs are forecasted. 
  With respect to the NVZ scheme we use annual data on the different transaction cost 
components with respect to the period 2006 to 2008. The observations are collected at the 
Environmental Agency defined regional budget level (i.e. Anglian, Midland, North East, North 
West, South West, Southern, Thames and Wales).
iv For the estimation of risk, technological 
characteristics and economic performance we use data on farm level contained in the Farm 
Business Survey provided annually by Defra. Our extracted sample consists of all farms 
participating in the ESS scheme and/or located in an NVZ area across England in the years 2006 to 
2008 (see table A1).  
Modelling I: Estimating Risk Proxies 
  To obtain valid proxies for the farmers‟ specific production risk we estimate a flexible profit 
function for the farms I at time T in the sample (see e.g. Christensen and Lau 1973). Hence, we 
first regress profit per farm and year   on a vector of variable input prices R (labor, land, fodder, 
veterinary & medical services, fertilizer, seeds, chemicals, capital), the relevant output price P (i.e. 
depending on robust type either milk price, livestock unit value, crop unit value, or an aggregated 
output price measure), and a vector of extra profit shifters C (time trend, farm type, farmer‟s age, 
debt ratio, rental value/gross margin, total subsidies/gross margin, less favoured area, degree of 
specialisation, government office, county location, off-farm income, altitude, area under the 
Nitrate Vulnerable Zone scheme) as well as an iid error term v: 
                              (18) 
Assuming profit maximisation we use the flexible functional form of a translog function and 
estimate the following model: 
             ∑                       ∑                    ∑               
 ∑               (19) 
where          . The o-th central moment of profit conditional on input use is defined as 
          {            }   (20) where μ1 denotes here the mean of profit. Thus, the estimated errors from the mean effect 
regression (  ̂           ) are estimates of the first moment of the profit distribution. These are 
squared and regressed on the set of explanatory variables from (19), which gives 
   ̂ 
                            (21) 
and by estimating (21) we obtain consistent and efficient estimates of the variance (2
nd moment). 
This procedure is followed to estimate also the third (i.e. skewness) and fourth (i.e. kurtosis) 
central moments based on the estimated errors raised to the power of three and four, respectively, 
used as dependent variables (see Antle 1983 and 1987). The estimates obtained for the four 
moments are used as proxies for the individual farmer‟s production risk by incorporating them 
directly into models of average cost regressions along with other explanatory variables. The 
models in (19) and (21) are estimated by applying Ordinary Least Squares treating the dataset as 
pooled yearly cross-sections.
v 
Modelling II: Estimating Technological Characteristics and Economic Performance 
  To obtain estimates of the production structure and performance of each farm we further 
estimate a flexible transformation function in a frontier specification. Such a transformation 
function is desirable for modeling technological processes because multiple outputs are produced 
by UK farms precluding the estimation of the technology by a production function, yet we wish to 
avoid the disadvantages of normalizing by one input or output as is required for a distance 
function. We thus rely on a transformation function model representing the most output producible 
from a given input base and existing conditions, which also represents the feasible production set. 
This function in general form can be written as 0=F(Y,X,T), where Y is a vector of outputs, X is a 
vector of inputs, and C is again a vector of (external) shift variables, which reflects the maximum 
amount of outputs producible from a given input vector and external conditions. Accordingly, we 
estimate the transformation function Y1= G(Y-1,X,C), where, Y1 is the primary output of the farm 
and Y-1 the vector of other outputs (secondary output), to represent the technological relationships 
for the farms in our data sample. Note that this specification does not reflect any endogeneity of 
output and input choices, but simply represents the technologically most Y1 that can be produced 
given the levels of the other arguments of the F() function (see Morrison-Paul and Sauer 2009). 
  We approximate the transformation function by a flexible functional form (second order 
approximation to the general function), to accommodate various interactions among the arguments 
of the function including non-constant returns to scale and technical change biases. We use the 
generalized linear functional form suggested by Diewert (1973) to avoid any mathematical 
transformations of the original data. The model can be described as: 
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                      ∑     
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                                  (22) 
for farm i in time period t, where YP = primary agricultural output, and YS = secondary output (i.e. 
total agricultural output less primary output) as the components of Y-1, X is a vector of Xk inputs 
land, labor, fodder, veterinary and medical expenses, seed, fertilizer, crop protection expenses, 
capital, livestock, and a time trend T as the only component of the T vector. Vit is assumed to be iid 
N(0, sv
2) random errors, and Uit ~N(mit, su
2) as the inefficiency term per farm and year (see Battese 
and Coelli 1995).
 
Modelling III: Estimating Instruments’ Cost Effects 
  The previously calculated average cost ratios are used to estimate the cost-effectiveness of the 
ESS scheme and the NVZ instrument at a regional level within a regression framework. Following 
equation (16) the different cost ratios are regressed on: A as a vector of administrative indicators at 
the regional level, F as a vector of technological characteristics and economic performance 
measures on farm level, R as a vector of risk proxies, S as a vector of individual farmer 
characteristics, E as a vector of environmental conditions including spatially defined 
characteristics. We define a simple linear model: 
             ∑         ∑         ∑      
    ∑      
    ∑               (23) 
for farm i in time period t. The elements of R* as well as some of the elements of vector F* are 
estimates resulting from the estimation of the flexible profit function (step 1) and the estimation of 
the transformation frontier (step 2). We estimate the model specified in equation (23) applying first 
a random effects generalized least squares (GLS) procedure according to 
              ∑         ∑         ∑      
    ∑      
    ∑                  (24) 
for farm i in time period t, where the variables and parameters are specified as above and i are the 
random effects with a normal distribution based on mean zero and constant variance (models 
NVZ1 and ESS1). Second, we estimate the model in (24) by applying a random effects GLS 
estimator and allowing for a first-order autoregressive disturbance term according to 
                                      (25) 
where |rho| < 1 and eit is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with zero mean and 
variance sigma_e*sigma_e.  This model maintains the assumption that the i  are independent of 
the xit by also accomodating covariates that are constant over time (see e.g. Baltagi and Wu 
1995). Further, this model allows for the consideration of lagged behaviour with respect to 
scheme management but also with respect to participation and compliance related behaviour at 
the individual farm level (models NVZ2 and ESS2).
vi   Finally a bootstrap based resampling estimation procedure is applied to receive evidence on the 
statistical robustness of the estimated standard errors (see e.g. Horowitz 2001). 
 
VI) Results and Discussion 
  All models estimated show a reasonable overall statistical significance. Additional diagnostic 
and quality tests have been conducted for the regressions and are reported in the appendix (see 
tables A3 and A4). In addition, the bootstrapped standard errors for the different cost ratios and 
estimated parameters show a high level of robustness.
 vii 
ESS versus NVZ 
  The estimated cost ratios show that the ESS scheme has a higher cost-effectiveness compared to 
the NVZ scheme in general (conditional on the per ha measure we use, the time period considered 
and the cost data provided). The NVZ scheme appears to be more “expensive” at a general level. 
However, if the focus is on the compliance weighted cost ratios this statement has to be further 
qualified: The mean cost per ha are more or less the same for the two instruments over the period 
2006 to 2008 considered (see also table 1). 
Table 1 - Bootstrapped Descriptive Statistics for ESS and NVZ Cost Ratios 
Cost-Ratio 
(GBP per ha and year) 
Regional 
Level 
Time Period  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum  95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
(Bias Corrected) 
Cost Ratio ESS  GOR  2006 - 2008  105.891  35.942  25.912  171.082  103.633  108.118 
Cost Ratio ESSc  GOR  2006 - 2008  162.621  110.176  27.351  470.475  155.703  169.539 
Cost Ratio NVZ  EA region  2006 - 2008  128.552  65.552  57.089  277.331  126.561  131.048 
Cost Ratio NVZc  EA region  2006 - 2008  163.836  88.045  65.124  380.389  160.496  167.177 
(GOR - government office region: 27 obs; EA - Environmental Agency region: 28 obs; 10,000 Bootstrap Replications; c - compliance weighted) 
Regional Variation 
The results show that the cost-effectiveness for the two instruments significantly varies at a 
regional level for the weighted and unweighted cost ratios. The definition of the administrative 
borders for the individual instrument‟s management are crucial for its cost-effectiveness. 
Variation over Time 
  The descriptive statistical results show for the NVZ instrument a significant decrease in cost per 
ha in the year 2006 as an increased area has been covered by the scheme. For the ESS scheme the 
descriptive results suggest a steady cost increase over time. It is evident that this cost increase is 
more pronounced for the compliance weighted cost ratio where the ESS scheme appears to be less 
cost-effective than the NVZ scheme in 2008. The increase in schemes‟ related cost per ha has been 
also driven by a decreasing compliance rate over all participating farms per region and year which 
is illustrated by figure 1. Given these findings we can conclude that the cost-effectiveness 
significantly varies over time for both instruments with a decrease in cost-effectiveness for the 
ESS scheme and mixed evidence for the cost-effectiveness of the NVZ scheme. These partial descriptive findings are backed up by the estimated coefficients for the time indicator variable (see 
tables A3 and A4). The coefficient is significantly positive over all cost models estimated, i.e. that 
the costs per ha significantly increase over time, and to a clearly higher extent for the compliance 
weighted costs. 
Figure 1 - Development of Instruments‟ Cost per ha in 2006 to 2008 (GBP per ha) 
 
With respect to the management agreement type instrument this could be due to an increasing 
number of farms accessing the scheme demanding payments to a higher degree than contributing 
land to the scheme. In addition, the effective dissemination of knowledge about the scheme‟s 
existence and mechanisms over time due to learning by doing among participating farms as well as 
peer-group/spillover effects based on social interaction with other farms could play a role. 
Contrary to theoretical considerations these empirical findings suggest that despite the enrolment 
of more land from lower payment regions which might have led to a reduction in the adverse 
selection problem and, hence, lower payment costs in some regions (Quillerou and Fraser 2009), 
the total costs per ha area under the ESS scheme increased in the years considered. This could be 
due to an increase in the administrative costs involved in setting-up and managing agreements. 
Falconer et al (2001) point out that the scheme costs are also expected to fall with years following 
scheme implementation due to administrative cost savings from fine-tuning and the learning 
processes that occur over time (leading the individuals and the administrations involved to learn to 
streamline processes, through building human capital, developing their understanding of the other 
transacting party etc.) Furthermore, over time, for both type of instruments changes in the mix of 
administrative activities are needed, linked to the time profile of scheme take-up. Hence, after a 
few years, the balance will switch from set-up activities such as promoting the scheme and 
entering into contracts to more routine maintenance activities (e.g. making compensatory 
payments and checking compliance) whereas the latter would be expected to be less costly than the set-up activities. In addition, trade-offs between different types of sub-scheme expenditures may 
exist. For example, greater expenditure on scheme promotion and information dissemination may 
allow savings to be made with regard to negotiating or enforcing management agreements, given 
an improved understanding of requirements and objectives. Finally, idiosyncratic factors such as 
staff turnover or competence levels will affect administrative efficiency. 
Technology and Performance 
  The regression results show a positive and significant cost effect for horticultural farms, pig 
farms and mixed type farms. But a negative and significant cost effect for dairy and cropping 
farms. The degree of farm specialisation, the value of the rental equivalent ratio, the level of 
technical efficiency and the amount of organic production showed to have a positive cost effect for 
the ESS scheme. A negative cost effect was found for the amount of off-farm income generated, 
the value of the debt to assets ratio, and a higher subsidies to gross margin ratio. The regression 
based estimates show firther a positive and significant cost effect for horticultural farms, lowland 
grazing farms, and mixed type farms, however, a negative and significant cost effect for lfa 
grazing farms, cropping and dairy farms. In addition we found a positive cost effect for the 
technical efficiency level of the farm, the amount of organic production, the value of the farm‟s 
rental equivalent, and the degree of farm specialisation. On the other hand a negative cost effect 
for off-farm income, the share of hired labor, the value of the farm‟s debt to assets ratio, and the 
value of the subsidies to gross margin ratio. With respect to the compliance weighted NVZ scheme 
cost ratios the descriptive statistical results show the lowest cost effectiveness for other type and 
cropping farms, but the highest cost effectiveness for dairy, poultry and lowland grazing farms. 
The regression based estimates show a negative and significant cost effect for pig and cereal type 
farms, a positive and significant cost effect for the amount of shared hired labor used on the farm, 
but a negative and significant cost effect for the amount of organic production by the farm. 
  We could not find any significant effect by the value of total sales as well as other performance 
indicators as e.g. the debt to asset ratios. The rate of technical efficiency of the farms, however, 
shows generally a positive cost effect but differing results for the command-and-control and the 
management agreement type models. Consequently, evidence for adverse selection is found only 
in the case of the unweighted NVZ scheme cost ratios. However, this could suggest that farms 
with a higher relative performance are more likely to comply with the scheme requirements as 
these farms are less dependent on the land put under the scheme. Based on these findings we 
formulate the following preliminary conclusions: (1) The cost-effectiveness of both instruments is 
the highest for cropping farms, which suggests that these farms might be more risk averse than 
others. (2) Dairy farms might respond more effectively to a management agreement-type instrument. (3) Farms with a significant amount of off-farm income and farms with a higher 
subsidies to gross margin ratio show a significantly higher cost-effectiveness for the management 
agreement-type instrument. (4) A technically more efficient farm appears to respond more cost-
effectively to the NVZ instrument. (5) The higher the share of organic production, the more cost-
effective the ESS instrument. (6) For farms with a high rental equivalent ratio, the NVZ instrument 
seems to be more cost-effective. (7) The more specialised the farm production the less cost-
effective agri-environmental instruments seem to be. 
Locational Characteristics 
The regression estimates show mixed cost effects for farms located in less favoured areas, but a 
positive cost effect for farms located at higher altitudes (corresponding to FBS type alt2 and alt3) 
for the NVZ instrument. With respect to the ESS scheme the results reveal a negative and 
significant cost effect for farms located in semi-high areas (corresponding to FBS type alt 2) and 
for farms with all land inside SDA (corresponding to FBS type lfa2). For the compliance weighted 
ESS scheme the regression results suggest a negative significant cost effect for farms with all land 
inside severely disadvantaged areas (SDA) or farms with all land inside disadvantaged areas (DA, 
corresponding to FBS types lfa2 and lfa3). The cost estimations revealed that spatial heterogeneity 
and environmental characteristics determine cost variation over regions. The higher the altitude of 
the farm location, the higher the average weighted NVZ scheme costs. However, these findings are 
the opposite for the unweighted ESS scheme indicating that the average altitute of the farm 
location has a significant positive effect for the cost-effectiveness of the management agreement 
type instrument. Further, the findings suggest that compliance behaviour might be not related to 
spatial heterogeneity. With respect to the Less Favoured Area (LFA category 7) indicators we 
found that the more farmland is part of such an area, the higher are the average costs per ha under 
the NVZ scheme. This could simply indicate that most NVZ areas are designated in less favoured 
areas, hence, the probability of being located in such a zone is simply much higher for LFA farms. 
The opposite result was found for the weighted ESS scheme‟s cost: Here the estimates suggest that 
the more land a particular farm has inside an SDA or DA (LFA categories 2 and 3) the lower are 
the costs for the ESS scheme per ha. Farms in such areas have a high incentive to use the relatively 
risk free income related to such ecosystem services, hence, the probablity that such farms join the 
scheme and actually comply with the requirements is relatively high compared to farms outside 
such areas. The inclusion of a substantial area of non LFA land in the ESS may increase 
administrative costs through increasing the complexity of negotiating management agreements. 
This would be not the case for land in severely disadvantaged areas as here the ecosystem services 
provided by the land are more presumably more uniform (see also MacFarlane, 1998). Based on these findings we can conclude: (1) A management agreement type instrument is more cost 
effective in less favoured areas. (2) Farmers in less favoured areas show a higher compliance with 
an agreement type instrument. (3) A command and control type instrument is more costly at higher 
altitudes. 
Socio-Economic Characteristics 
  The regression estimates show for the NVZ and NVZ compliance weighted cost ratios a 
negative cost effect for education, i.e. the better educated the farmer the lower the costs of the 
instrument per ha. On the other hand the results also show a positive cost effect for the amount of 
off-farm income generated. For the ESS and ESS compliance weighted cost ratios a positive cost 
effect for age was found, i.e. the younger the participating farmer the lower the costs of the ESS 
instrument per ha. However, we found a negative cost effect for the amount of off-farm income 
generated. These findings indicate that age (and likely also farming experience) is a significant 
factor for scheme compliance: the younger the average paticipating farmer, the higher the average 
compliance rate per region, and consequently the lower the average scheme costs per region. 
These findings suggest that the individual cost of compliance are lower for younger farms which 
might reflect positive attitudes towards conservation or more cost effective management skills 
with respect to the requirements of the scheme. However, positive farmer attitudes towards 
conservation and the scheme might be linked to lower transactions costs. The broad co-operation 
of entrants with the agency would mean that environmental agencies could rely far more on self-
enforcement, thus reducing compliance checks (see Falconer et al 2001).The positive age effect 
found for the unweighted models, however, could imply that older farmers show a higher interest 
in the scheme in general. In addition, those farmers located in less favoured areas and hence are 
more interested in agri-environmental schemes are of higher age as the probability of a younger 
successors is relatively low. 
  The amount of income generated by off-farm activities was found to be significantly negative 
correlated with the average ESS scheme costs for the compliance weighted and unweighted 
models (differing from the NVZ cost effects). This could suggest that the decision to allocate 
labour to the conservation activities under the scheme agreement and the decision to allocate 
labour to off-farm activities are correlated. Farms that generate a higher amount of income by non-
agricultural activities are more likely to comply with scheme requirements as less time and labor 
resources are available for hidden non-compliance related actions and/or a softer budget constraint 
exists. Further the income effects of general production and market risk are less significant for 
such farms. With respect to the input land this could imply that the higher the share of total output 
due to off-farm income, the lower are the opportunity costs of using land for non-market uses, hence, the higher the willingness to give land under the scheme and finally the lower the scheme 
costs per ha. Also, the higher the share of total output due to off-farm income, the higher is the 
willingness of the farmer to comply with the conservation agreement as the opportunity costs of 
using land and other inputs for the scheme are even lower, hence, off-farm income increases 
compliance and decreases average scheme costs. Based on these findings we formulate the 
following preliminary policy conclusions: (1) Age has a different effect on the instruments cost 
effectiveness: Younger farmers are more likely to respond positive to/and comply with 
management agreement type policies. (2) A higher level of education contributes to a higher cost 
effectiveness of command and control type policies. (3) Off farm activities have different 
implications for the instruments‟ cost effectiveness: A management agreement type instrument is 
more effective for part-time farmers. 
Risk 
The regression results show for the NVZ scheme a positive cost effect of all profit related 
distributional moments (i.e. risk proxies). Further, the higher the level of the farner‟s education, 
the higher the amount of off-farm income generated, the higher the degree of the farm‟s 
specialisation the lower the negative effects of the risk proxies‟ on the scheme‟s cost effectiveness. 
In addition the estimates reveal that the size of the farm increases the cost effects of risk, time on 
the other hand shows to have mixed effects on the risk proxies‟ cost implications. For the ESS 
scheme the regressions suggest a negative cost effect of the profit related distributional moments 
(i.e. risk proxies) whereas the age (i.e. experience) of the farmer and the size of the farm size both 
show a compensating effect on the risk proxies‟ cost effects. The amount of off-farm income 
generated increases the cost effects of risk, and time again shows to have mixed effects on the risk 
proxies‟ cost implications. The regressions show for the ESS scheme further that controlling for 
scheme compliance lead to a less pronounced cost effect for the risk proxies, however, we find still 
a negative cost effect for the 3
rd and 4
th moment of profit (i.e. skewness and kurtosis of profit). The 
age and experience of the farmer shows still a compensating effect on the risk proxies‟ cost effects, 
whereas the size of the farm, the degree of farm specialisation as well as off-farm income all seem 
to have a reinforcing effect on the risk proxies cost implications. With respect to the compliance 
weighted NVZ scheme cost ratios the estimates imply a negative effect of the risk proxies for the 
1
st and 4
th moment (mean and kurtosis of profit). Here, only time shows a compensating effect on 
the risk proxies‟ cost effects, whereas again the size of the farm has a reinforcing effect on the risk 
proxies cost implications. 
  The majority of estimated coefficients for the risk proxies show a significant influence on the 
average scheme costs investigated. We found that the higher the farmers‟ expected profit (i.e. the less significant the influence of production and market risk), the lower the average ESS scheme 
costs per ha as the willingness/need to join the scheme to hedge against such risk effects decreases 
and hence the scheme costs related to compensation payments are lower. A positive cost effect has 
been found with respect to profit variance (or the variability of the risk effects on mean profit) for 
the unweighted NVZ and ESS models implying that farmers use the scheme income as a means to 
hedge against such risk. Further the results reveal, that the higher the expected upside profit 
variability (negative skewnee estimate), the lower the significance of risk and the probability of 
loss, hence, the lower the willingness/need to join management agreement type agri-env schemes 
to hedge against such risk. Based on these findings we formulate the following preliminary policy 
conclusions: (1) The farms‟ actual market/production risk has significant effects on the 
instruments‟ cost effectiveness. (2) Such risk leads to a lower cost effectiveness for the command 
and control type instrument, but a higher cost effectiveness for the management agreement type 
instrument. (3) Risk averse farmers who face uncertainty in their production income are more 
likely to comply with voluntary agri-environmental schemes as a means of risk management (to 
hedge against such risk effects). (4) To address such adverse risk effects for the NVZ instrument, 
the support of part-time farming but also the support of intensification/specialisation could be 
relevant. (5) To exploit the beneficial risk effects for the ESS instrument, again the support of part-
time farming but also the support of intensification/specialisation could be relevant. (6) The level 
of education, knowledge dissemination and spillover effects matter with respect to the cost-
effectiveness of the command and control type instrument. 
Scheme Scale and Scope 
The regression results show finally for the unweighted and compliance weighted NVZ scheme 
related cost ratios that the more utilised agricultural area (uaa) is under the NVZ scheme per farm, 
the lower the average costs per ha for the scheme (i.e. economies of scale with respect to scheme 
participation). Further, the more farm output is generated by compensation payments from the ESS 
program, the lower the costs per ha for the NVZ scheme which suggests economies of scope with 
respect to agri-environmental schemes‟ participation. The regression results show for the 
compliance weighted and unweighted ESS scheme related cost ratios that the more uaa is under 
the scheme per farm, the lower the average costs per ha for the ESS scheme (i.e. economies of 
scale with respect to scheme participation). The findings, however, do not confirm the cost savings 
with respect to multi-scheme participation found for the NVZ scheme. The strong empirical 
evidence for significant cost savings due to economies of scope with respect to both agri-
environmental schemes suggests, that there are indeed positive spillover effects from the joint 
implementation of, and participation of farmers in, other related agri-environmental schemes: total administration costs might increase in a non-linear way with the number of additional schemes as 
the costs of activities such as initial farm surveys and ecological monitoring can be shared. Based 
on these findings we formulate the following preliminary policy conclusions: (1) Economies of 
scale are the case for both instruments, i.e. cost savings and a higher cost-effectiveness can be 
reached by larger farms under the schemes. (2) Economies of scope (or joint production effects) 
are only confirmed for the command and control instrument. Hence, if a farm is already located in 
a an NVZ area, the implementation of the instrument will be more cost-effective if the farm also 
participates in the management agreement-type instrument. This could probably be explained by 
the resulting higher compliance rate for the NVZ instrument. 
 
  In summary: The cost-effectiveness of the ESS instrument is higher than the cost-effectiveness 
of the NVZ instrument for the unweighted case. However, this result changes if the focus is on the 
compliance weighted cost ratios where for the period 2006 to 2008 the mean cost per ha are more 
or less the same for the two instruments over the period considered. The results show further that 
the cost-effectiveness for the ESS and the NVZ schemes varies on a regional level as well as over 
time. Regional and sectoral variation in the scheme uptake and cost of compliance for the 
participating farms lead to significant cost effects reflecting heterogeneity with respect to 
socioeconomic characteristics, management skills and attitudes, production focus, location, 
technologies, economic performance and risk. Finally, the empirical analysis revealed significant 
economies of scale and scope with respect to the management of agri-environmental schemes. 
  To the background of previous theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence our findings 
suggest the following: Earlier findings that more extensive and less environmentally degrading 
production systems are more likely to participate in the conservation scheme (Hynes and Garvey 
2009) can not be confirmed by the findings for the ESS scheme so far. Considering compliance 
behaviour makes a difference with respect to the average scheme cost supporting the conclusions 
by Falconer et al (2001) that the extent of scheme participation is important in explaining 
administrative cost variability across space. We further found that the decisions to participate in a 
conservation scheme and work off the farm are correlated (Chang and Boisvert 2009). Age has an 
effect on the willingness to join and comply with the scheme requirements (Vanslembrouck 2002), 
the individual cost of compliance vary by age and experience. The significance of the scale of 
scheme participation/exposure also reflects the effects of peer-group interaction and the 
importance of network externalities with respect to information gathering and compliance 
signalling (Brock and Durlauf 2001, Sauer and Zilberman 2009). Our results confirm theoretical 
reasoning on the importance of risk for the scheme participants‟ behaviour, scheme costs decrease 
as the individual compliance costs decrease as a result of increasing market and production risk (Fraser 2009). Hence, incentive-compatible scheme design has to be based on quantifiable risk 
measures (Peterson and Boisvert 2004, Yano and Blandford 2009, Zabel and Roe 2009). However, 
the  general notion that higher risk aversion and higher income uncertainty automatically lead to 
lower costs for the conservation agency can not be confirmed. 
  By controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and/or path dependency with respect to farm and 
farmer specific factors our modelling approach reveals significant scheme cost effects by space 
and administrative cluster related factors (Hynes and Garvey 2009). Further, technological 
characteristics and economic performance related factors are essential to correctly understand and 
predict farms‟ participation and compliance behaviour (Berentsen et al 2007). Adverse selection 
related cost implications can be approximated by relevant performance measurement on farm 
level. Our analysis confirms the empirical validity of earlier suggestions of a spatially defined 
scheme payment mechanism reflecting the spatial heterogeneity of environmental impacts 
(Waetzold and Drechsler 2005, Canton et al 2009, Fraser 2009). Spatial targeting should be used 
by the conservation agency or regulator to reduce the cost effects of asymmetric information. This 
could be linked to a delegation of the scheme implementation to sub-regional authorities to 
significantly reduce such deficiencies. Finally, our results show that the joint production of policy 
instruments can lead to cost savings through scope and scale effects. There are indeed positive 
spillover effects from the joint implementation of, and participation of farmers in, other related 
agri-environmental schemes: total administration costs might increase in a non-linear way (Heyes 
1998). Hence, there is scope for the conservation agency to exploit „issue-linkage‟ (i.e. the farmer 




This analysis contributes to the agri-environmental policy relevant literature in the following 
ways: There are still only a very few empirical studies available investigating the performance of 
environmental schemes using microdata at the farm level. We control for the actual level of 
compliance per region by using compliance weighted average scheme cost ratios for a command 
and control versus a management agreement type instrument. Beside technological and economic 
performance measures, we also consider proxies for risk at farm level. By this we go further than 
existing studies on environmental schemes and aim to empirically investigate the theoretically well 
explored policy implications of adverse selection and moral hazard. In addition we consider 
unobserved heterogeneity or path dependency with respect to unknown spatial and farm specific 
factors. By applying a three-stage estimation procedure we significantly contribute to the literature by improving on earlier empirical studies. To avoid small sample bias and non-robust results we 
use a satisfactorily large sample for the full NVZ and ESS schemes and a statistical resampling 
procedure to generate robust results. However, existing constraints upon the administrative budget 
setting process mean that administrative inputs are unlikely to be optimal at any given time, hence, 
the empirical results must be interpreted with caution. The inflexibility in administrative structures 
must also be considered: e.g. planned staffing adjustments are likely to be made only on a pre-
fixed time basis. Input quality variations must be taken into account when evaluating 
administrative performance which are not ncessarily reflected in the costs (e.g. in wage costs). 
Nevertheless, despite the empirical findings are subject to data availability they have essential 
utility in providing benchmark figures for further schemes‟ revisions towards an increased 
instruments‟ efficiency. Consequently, the following policy implications should be outlined: 
(1) To increase the cost-effectiveness of a command and control type instrument, knowledge 
dissemination and spillover effects via interest and peer-groups should be used. 
(2) A management agreement-type instrument is more cost-effective for organic farms, part-time 
farmers and for farms located in less favoured areas (LFA). 
(3) In terms of mitigating adverse risk effects on the instrument's cost-effectiveness, supporting 
the schemes‟ take-up by part-time farmers and specialised farmers would assist in achieving that 
outcome. The negative effects for the instruments‟ cost due to risk are significantly lower for 
part-time farmers and highly specialised farms. 
(4) Compliance monitoring for management agreement-type instruments should focus on farms 
outside of LFA. 
(5) The targeting of larger farms would lead to cost savings and a higher cost-effectiveness for 
both instruments. 
(6) The consideration of compliance behaviour makes a difference with respect to the average 
scheme cost supporting the view that the extent of scheme participation is important in 
explaining administrative cost-effectiveness variability across space and sectors. 
(7) The individual cost of compliance vary by age and experience of the scheme participant 
which points to the importance of scheme marketing and information dissemination. 
(8) Incentive-compatible scheme design has to take into account also the individual risk faced by 
the farmer. The findings suggest that production and market risk have a significant influence on 
the inidvidual farmer‟s behaviour regarding participation and compliance with the instruments 
investigated. Considering these effects the instruments‟ cost-effectiveness could be increased e.g. 
by offering different compensation payments per option for farmers facing different degrees of 
risk. (9) Informed (and quantified) analysis about recipients technological characteristics and 
economic performance is crucial for the instruments success. Economic performance and 
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Table A1 - Descriptive Statistics for Farms Participating in the ESS scheme (2006 to 2008) 
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
total output (GBP)  284252.6  426218  8177  9194788 
primary output (GBP; > 50% of agricultural output)  187033.1  322753.6  275  7090607 
secondary output (GBP)  97219.53  141102.8  1  2170542 
land (ha)  196.364  222.298  7.28  2587.23 
labor (hours)  5532.233  8858.383  36  231925 
fodder (GBP)  1673.098  5034.601  1  96098 
veterinary and medical expenses (GBP)  3744.154  5748.532  1  67859 
seed (GBP)  8482.003  34955.35  1  1086259 
fertilizer (GBP)  13877.77  22433.84  1  356503 
crop protection (GBP)  12367.77  28382.85  1  330271 
capital (GBP)  58020.48  102800.2  1  2407886 
livestock units (n)  120.553  136.1422  0.21  2482 
FBS robust type „cereals‟  0.252  0.434  0  1 
FBS robust type „general cropping‟  0.122  0.327  0  1 
FBS robust type „horticulture‟  0.014  0.118  0  1 
FBS robust type „pigs‟  0.008  0.092  0  1 
FBS robust type „poultry‟  0.006  0.074  0  1 
FBS robust type „dairy‟  0.153  0.361  0  1 
FBS robust type „lfa grazing livestock‟  0.192  0.394  0  1 
FBS robust type „lowland grazing livestock‟  0.128  0.334  0  1 
FBS robust type „mixed‟  0.120  0.334  0  1 
FBS robust type „other‟  0.004  0.065  0  1 
degree of specialisation 
(primary outout/total output)  0.606  0.189  0.006  1 
off-farm income (GBP)  10001.81  17244.68  0  301750 
debt to assets ratio  0.149  0.247  2.40e-06  8.847 
profit (loss) per ha (GBP)  1929.557  4204.859  -133.891  80475.13 
area under NVZ scheme (ha)  45.207  49.501  0  328 
payments received from HFA scheme (GBP)  778.877  1888.806  0  16557 
altitude „below 300m‟ (0 or 1)  0.886  0.318  0  1 
altitude „300m to 600m‟ (0 or 1)  0.106  0.308  0  1 
altitude „600m or over‟ (0 or 1)  0.008  0.090  0  1 
LFA: „all land outside lfa‟ (0 or 1)  0.731  0.443  0  1 
LFA: „all land inside sda‟ (0 or 1)  0.093  0.290  0  1 
LFA: „all land inside da‟ (0 or 1)  0.043  0.204  0  1 
LFA: „50%+ in lfa of which 50%+ in sda‟ (0 or 1)  0.063  0.244  0  1 
LFA: „50%+ in lfa of which 50%+ in da‟ (0 or 1)  0.041  0.198  0  1 
LFA: „<50% in lfa of which 50%+ in sda‟ (0 or 1)  0.007  0.087  0  1 
LFA: „<50% in lfa of which 50%+ in da‟ (0 or 1)  0.021  0.142  0  1 
age (years)  53.703  10.525  22  90 
gender (0-male, 1-female)  0.025  0.156  0  1 
year 2006 (0 or 1)  0.252  0.434  0  1 
year 2007 (0 or 1)  0.330  0.470  0  1 
year 2008 (0 or 1)  0.418  0.493  0  1 
(2286 observations; financial variables deflated to base year 2006; FBS – farm business survey, NVZ – nitrate vulnerable scheme, 





Table A2 - Technological Variables and Risk Proxies for Farm Sample (2006 to 2008, 2286 observations) 
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
technical efficiency   0.463  0.217  0.106  1 
farm size (FBS size bands 1 to 3)  2.154  0.820  1  3 
scale inefficiency   0.179  0.335  0.132  0.978 
risk proxy 1 – expected profit (mean)  -9.46e-10      0.681    -3.215     2.586 
risk proxy 2 – profit variability (variance)  0.465     0.275    -0.370     4.539 
risk proxy 3 – profit asymmetry (skewness)   -0.012     0.406    -12.214      1.533 
risk proxy 4 – profit peakedness (kurtosis)  0.808      1.539    -2.986    47.219 
risk proxy 5 – effect on expected profit*time   -2.88e-09      -1.584    -9.647     7.323 
risk proxy 6 – variability of effect on expected profit*time   1.017      0.757    -0.370     13.619 
risk proxy 7 – asymmetry of effect on expected profit*time   -0.043      1.017    -36.642     4.088 
risk proxy 8 – peakedness of effect on expected profit*time   1.809      3.963    -5.941     141.659 Table A3 - Estimates Various Panel Regressions Nitrate Vulnerable Zones 
 
  Model 1 RE NVZ  Model 2 AR(1) NVZ  Model 1 RE NVZc    Model 2 AR(1) NVZc   
Dependent Variable  CE NVZ  CE NVZ  CE NVZc    CE NVZc   
Independent Variables  est  se 
5  est  se 
5  est  se 
5  est  se 
5 
time  9.35***  0.28  10.18***  0.34  30.77***  0.49  30.43***  0.52 
ea01  -169.48***  2.49  -76.57***  2.69  69.46***  6.97  69.80***  10.09 
ea02  -124.15***  2.57  -33.29***  2.71  102.06**  5.01  102.04***  5.08 
ea03  -44.41***  2.74  42.93***  3.04  39.01***  4.82  39.18***  4.88 
ea04  7.88***  2.99  103.81***  3.29  -46.68***  4.62  -47.29***  4.31 
ea05  -89.65***  3.05  88.95***  3.58  -26.78***  4.62  -27.01***  4.67 
ea07  -162.97***  3.07  -66.77***  3.39  -74.99***  4.17  -75.23***  4.23 
Robust Type 1 „cereals‟  -2.31***  0.51  -0.97*  0.67  -19.79**  9.45  -19.03**  9.64 
Robust Type 2 „general cropping‟  -1.98***  0.58  -1.12**  0.61  -16.65*  9.55  -16.48*  9.75 
Robust Type 3 „horticulture‟  5.60  5.14  2.86  6.14  -3.38  9.55  -4.38  9.75 
Robust Type 4 „pigs‟  5.21  5.41  4.91  6.58  -21.07**  10.22  -21.42**  10.46 
Robust Type 5 „poultry‟  8.54  5.06  6.89  6.72  -9.67  10.45  -10.12  10.67 
Robust Type 6 „dairy‟  2.19***  0.57  0.97*  0.63  -18.32  9.37  -17.91  9.51 
Robust Type 7 „lfa grazing livestock‟  2.75***  0.69  1.46**  0.73  -2.52  11.46  -1.51  11.69 
Robust Type 8 „lowland grazing livestock‟  2.98  5.12  3.28  6.11  -12.54  9.49  -13.06  9.69 
Robust Type 9 „mixed‟  5.56  5.16  5.12  6.12  -16.24*  9.52  -16.21*  9.73 
technical efficiency 
1  -6.52  4.47  -7.89*  4.80  10.92  7.98  13.55  7.90 
organic production  3.74**  1.99  3.72  2.75  -7.78*  4.27  -7.11*  4.31 
total sales  -2.13e-06  1.91e-06  -2.31e-06  2.36e-06  3.97e-06  3.71e-06  4.65e-06  3.77e-06 
farm size  -0.13  0.55  -0.48  0.65  -0.63  1.04  -0.41  1.05 
subsidies  5.94e-05***  2.11e-05  7.92e-05***  2.51e-05  5.3e-05  3.93e-05  4.14e-05  4.02e-05 
off-farm income  9.24e-05**  5.03e-05  3.81e-05  5.61e-05  -1.78e-05  8.94e-05  -2.26e-05  9.02e-05 
share of hired labor  -13.56***  1.56  -12.76***  1.46  8.02***  2.53  6.46***  2.45 
rental equivalent  -3.76***  1.26  -4.68***  1.17  -1.84  2.04  -0.16  1.96 
debt to assets  1.76  2.19  0.71  2.04  -4.24  3.56  -3.41  3.44 
tenancy ratio  -3.19***  0.85  -2.71***  0.77  -2.56*  1.39  -2.01*  1.30 
ratio subsidies to gross margin  7.56***  2.46  5.20**  2.29  16.36***  3.97  14.08***  3.83 
contracting  -2.05  2.74  -2.68  2.58  3.31  4.39  2.44  4.29 
degree of specialisation  6.46***  2.28  6.22***  2.16  -0.37  3.71  -2.31  3.60 
Altitude 2 – Most of Holding at 300m-600m 
3  2.85  3.63  4.17  4.63  10.97  7.25  11.48*  7.31 
Altitude 3 – Most of Holding at >600m 
3  17.35***  5.72  18.31**  7.36  17.74  11.59  19.04*  11.71 
Less Favoured Area 2 – All Land inside SDA 
4  -3.43  4.24  -1.41  5.48  -8.53  8.67  -9.78  8.79 
Less Favoured Area 3 – All Land inside DA 
4  1.82  4.33  4.85  5.47  8.78  8.59  6.08  8.75 
Less Favoured Area 4 –50%+ Land in LFA of which 50%+ in SDA 
4  -3.42  4.53  -0.34  5.81  -5.77  9.01  -5.28  9.24 
Less Favoured Area 5 –50%+ Land in LFA of which 50%+ in DA 
4  -2.36  5.31  -1.26  6.89  -2.05  10.87  -3.39  11.09 
Less Favoured Area 6 –<50% Land in LFA of which 50%+ in SDA 
4  -2.22  10.98  -12.57  12.92  32.95*  19.62  21.34  20.49 
Less Favoured Area 7 –<50% Land in LFA of which 50%+ in DA 
4  16.82***  7.01  20.58***  8.05  -5.61  13.81  -5.67  13.99 
1 : Estimates obtained by Generalized Transformation Frontier; 2 : Estimates obtained by Translog Profit Function; 3 : Reference Category „Most of Holding <300m‟; 
4 : Reference Category „All Land outside LFA‟; *,**,*** : Significance at 10%- , 5%- , or 1%-Level; 5: Bootstrapped SE. 
   Table A3 cont. 
 
Independent Variables  est  se 
5  est  se 
5  est  se 
5  est  se 
5 
Age  -0.11**  0.05  -0.12***  0.04  0.23*  0.09  0.24**  0.09 
Education  -1.54***  0.46  -2.02***  0.43  0.97  0.75  -8.63e-03  0.72 
Risk Proxy 1 – Expected Profit (Mean) 
2  45.81*  20.97  31.43*  20.47  -105.12**  40.88  -89.91**  39.47 
Risk Proxy 2 – Profit Variability (Variance) 
2  639.78***  182.31  432.68**  172.74  1271.89***  294.32  981.66***  286.48 
Risk Proxy 3 – Profit Asymmetry (Skewness) 
2  -30.69  62.55  131.03**  62.33  905.95  105.55  837.67  103.01 
Risk Proxy 4 – Profit Peakedness (Kurtosis) 
2  239.18***  81.14  132.11*  82.28  -1025.77***  139.39  -929.76***  137.04 
Risk Proxy 5 – Expected Profit * Age 
2  -0.31  0.35  -0.12  0.32  0.34  0.56  0.19  0.54 
Risk Proxy 6 – Variability of Profit * Age 
2  0.07  2.45  0.96  2.29  -3.31  3.95  -1.66  3.83 
Risk Proxy 7 – Expected Profit * Education 
2  -6.71**  3.17  -4.58*  2.94  -0.72  5.05  -0.41  4.92 
Risk Proxy 8 – Variability of Profit * Education 
2  26.59  18.73  -31.53**  17.01  4.14  29.99  17.93  28.80 
Risk Proxy 9 – Expected Profit * Time 
2  -3.12**  1.46  -3.02**  1.34  4.50**  2.32  3.61*  2.24 
Risk Proxy 10 – Variability of Profit * Time 
2  54.73***  10.27  29.43***  10.66  -94.71***  16.94  -79.09***  17.12 
Risk Proxy 11 – Expected Profit * Specialisation 
2  -7.16  14.45  -2.81  13.31  12.87  23.11  23.99  22.32 
Risk Proxy 12 – Variability of Profit * Specialisation 
2  -151.62*  93.51  -167.48**  88.59  -87.65  151.52  -28.25  147.62 
Risk Proxy 13 – Expected Profit * Off-Farm Income 
2  -3.39e-04  3.36e-04  -2.34e-04  3.12e-04  5.32e-04  5.34e-05  3.75e-04  5.19e-04 
Risk Proxy 14 – Variability of Profit * Off-Farm Inc. 
2  -3.51e-03**  1.81e-03  -3.75e-03**  1.87e-03  0.005*  0.003  0.004  0.003 
Risk Proxy 15 – Expected Profit * Farm Size 
2  6.81**  3.02  5.29**  2.76  16.63***  4.73  14.88***  4.61 
Risk Proxy 16 – Variability of Profit * Farm Size 
2  35.85**  18.09  48.83***  19.04  5.93  32.91  0.21  32.26 
Area under Nitrate Vulnerable Scheme  -0.05**  0.02  -0.07**  0.03  -0.22***  0.05  -0.22***  0.05 
Income due to Environmental Stewardship Scheme  -6.97e-04***  1.02e-04  -7.35e-04***  1.16e-04  -0.001***  1.78e-04  -0.001***  1.84e-04 
Constant  212.95***  12.11  124.28***  14.41  -57.58  13.87  -52.27***  14.02 
R-Square Within  0.2710    0.2766    0.4609    0.4597   
R-Square Between  0.9498    0.9454    0.8046    0.8052   
R-Square Overall  0.7834    0.7807    0.6861    0.6852   
Wald Chi2(52) / Prob > Chi2
  19806.78   (0.000)  12035.27   (0.000)  10090.53  (0.000)  9018.23  (0.000) 
Number of Observations (n)  5534    5534    5534    5534   
Number of Groups (n)  1705    1705    1705    1705   
Observations per Group (min/avg/max)  1/3.2/9    1/3.2/9    1/3.2/9    1/3.2/9   
rho_ar  ---    0.414    ---    0.241   
modified DW-test  ---    1.259    ---    1.578   
Baltagi-Wu-LBI  ---    1.654    ---    2.062   
Bootstrap Replications  10,000    10,000    10,000    10,000   
1 : Estimates obtained by Generalized Transformation Frontier; 2 : Estimates obtained by Translog Profit Function; 3 : Reference Category „Most of Holding <300m‟; 
4 : Reference Category „All Land outside LFA‟; *,**,*** : Significance at 10%- , 5%- , or 1%-Level; 5: Bootstrapped SE. 
 
 
        
Table A4 - Estimates Various Panel Regressions Environmental Stewardship Scheme 
 
  Model 1 RE ESS  Model 2 AR(1) ESS    Model 1 RE ESSc    Model 2 AR(1) ESSc   
Dependent Variable  CE ESS  CE ESS  CE ESSc    CE ESSc   
Independent Variables  est  se 
5  est  se 
5  est  se 
5  est  se 
5 
time  35.52***  0.44  35.51***  0.45  72.83***  1.99  72.69***  2.02 
gor01  33.59***  1.98  33.32***  2.07  9.76  8.99  7.49  10.37 
gor02  49.43***  1.15  48.72***  1.22  12.27**  5.21  5.64  6.27 
gor05  35.22***  1.05  34.72**  1.11  11.08***  4.74  5.75  5.79 
gor06  57.15***  0.98  56.96***  1.04  31.83***  4.45  28.26***  5.38 
gor08  77.61***  1.13  77.88***  1.19  254.18***  5.11  259.24***  6.06 
Robust Type 1 „cereals‟  4.08  3.01  4.05  3.22  21.92*  13.01  24.59  16.69 
Robust Type 2 „general cropping‟  -5.02*  3.08  -5.01*  3.02  -27.36**  13.91  -29.91*  17.06 
Robust Type 3 „horticulture‟  7.07**  3.59  6.84*  3.82  35.66**  16.29  33.78*  19.69 
Robust Type 4 „pigs‟  2.57***  0.41  2.43***  0.44  23.12  18.72  24.37  23.35 
Robust Type 5 „poultry‟  5.91  4.19  5.77  4.39  22.23  18.97  22.66  22.05 
Robust Type 6 „dairy‟  -3.86**  1.94  -3.81***  0.35  -24.64*  13.31  -26.95*  16.32 
Robust Type 7 „lfa grazing livestock‟  3.54  3.66  3.42  3.89  -28.42***  6.55  -29.89***  2.05 
Robust Type 8 „lowland grazing livestock‟  4.88  3.91  4.79  3.92  23.98*  13.63  25.69*  16.07 
Robust Type 9 „mixed‟  4.85*  2.99  4.76*  3.01  25.59*  13.56  27.14*  16.71 
technical efficiency 
1  2.35***  0.26  0.58*  0.25  7.91***  1.16  4.24***  1.91 
organic production  -0.96***  0.18  -0.96***  0.11  -8.08*  4.90  -8.21  5.56 
total sales  -1.04e-06  1.28e-06  -1.11e-06  1.36e-06  -5.13e-06  5.81e-06  -6.51e-06  6.94e-06 
farm size  0.25  0.31  0.27  0.33  1.67  1.42  2.18  1.64 
subsidies  1.30e-07  7.86e-06  3.99e-07  8.33e-06  -1.37e-05  3.56e-06  -8.90e-06  4.26e-05 
off-farm income  -1.11e-05***  2.10e-06  -1.31e-05***  2.11e-06  -3.84e-05***  9.04e-06  -7.04e-05  1.05e-04 
share of hired labor  0.85  0.86  -0.98  0.88  -8.34**  3.92  -9.84**  3.93 
rental equivalent  3.07***  0.74  3.17***  0.75  10.49**  3.33  10.34***  3.28 
debt to assets  -3.78***  1.22  -3.77***  1.24  -16.42***  5.53  -15.68***  5.46 
tenancy ratio  -0.52  0.43  -0.56  0.43  0.09  1.95  -0.51  1.86 
ratio subsidies to gross margin  -2.26*  1.37  -2.23*  1.30  -15.02**  6.21  -10.95*  6.09 
contracting  0.82  1.76  0.86  1.78  5.27  7.96  4.25  7.85 
degree of specialisation  1.61***  0.21  1.86*  1.03  1.25***  0.55  3.74***  0.56 
Altitude 2 – Most of Holding at 300m-600m 
3  -0.29***  0.11  -0.54***  0.21  -2.15  9.05  -2.77  11.38 
Altitude 3 – Most of Holding at >600m 
3  4.38  4.99  4.58  5.39  12.56  22.59  14.82  29.12 
Less Favoured Area 2 – All Land inside SDA 
4  -4.43*  2.73  -2.72***  0.29  -5.71***  1.39  -5.49***  1.71 
Less Favoured Area 3 – All Land inside DA 
4  -1.74  3.19  -1.61  3.38  -8.56***  1.44  -8.13***  1.39 
Less Favoured Area 4 –50%+ Land in LFA of which 50%+ in SDA 
4  0.65  2.95  0.68  3.15  -1.75  13.33  -1.66  16.61 
Less Favoured Area 5 –50%+ Land in LFA of which 50%+ in DA 
4  4.54  3.33  4.84  3.55  3.41  15.09  4.72  18.54 
Less Favoured Area 6 –<50% Land in LFA of which 50%+ in SDA 
4  -0.68  8.67  -0.52  8.89  -2.55  39.25  -0.75  43.18 
Less Favoured Area 7 –<50% Land in LFA of which 50%+ in DA 
4  -1.78  3.11  -2.10  3.23  -6.14  14.03  -9.21  16.14 
1 : Estimates obtained by Generalized Transformation Frontier; 2 : Estimates obtained by Translog Profit Function; 3 : Reference Category „Most of Holding <300m‟; 
4 : Reference Category „All Land outside LFA‟; *,**,*** : Significance at 10%- , 5%- , or 1%-Level; 5: Bootstrapped SE. 
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Independent Variables  est  se 
5  est  se 
5  est  se 
5  est  se 
5 
Age  0.07**  0.03  0.07***  0.02  0.22**  0.11  0.21**  0.09 
Education  .023  0.31  0.29  0.31  0.41  1.36  1.07  1.33 
Risk Proxy 1 – Expected Profit (Mean) 
2  -1.39***  0.49  -2.65***  0.41  72.57  185.07  16.57  179.92 
Risk Proxy 2 – Profit Variability (Variance) 
2  247.79  222.80  282.12  226.70  890.04  1008.45  999.16  1013.52 
Risk Proxy 3 – Profit Asymmetry (Skewness) 
2  -78.53**  35.33  -71.92**  36.19  -387.53***  159.91  -282.78**  166.03 
Risk Proxy 4 – Profit Peakedness (Kurtosis) 
2  -99.02**  49.32  -99.69**  50.59  -600.668***  223.25  -646.01***  229.66 
Risk Proxy 5 – Expected Profit * Age 
2  -0.51*  0.28  -0.55**  0.21  -2.67**  1.29  -3.33***  1.26 
Risk Proxy 6 – Variability of Profit * Age 
2  -1.31  1.71  -1.41  1.73  1.95  7.73  2.06  7.59 
Risk Proxy 7 – Expected Profit * Education 
2  2.85  3.51  2.92  3.54  1.55  15.84  1.42  15.28 
Risk Proxy 8 – Variability of Profit * Education 
2  -9.39  16.28  -14.61  16.52  -59.36  73.71  -88.29  72.53 
Risk Proxy 9 – Expected Profit * Time 
2  -0.06  3.86  0.71  3.92  -5.92  17.49  3.75  17.31 
Risk Proxy 10 – Variability of Profit * Time 
2  -11.26  21.76  -12.02  22.14  -33.11  98.49  -26.21  99.51 
Risk Proxy 11 – Expected Profit * Specialisation 
2  6.15  11.25  6.87  11.38  89.79*  50.94  105.66**  49.61 
Risk Proxy 12 – Variability of Profit * Specialisation 
2  13.65  63.77  5.62  64.83  97.01  288.63  80.67  289.11 
Risk Proxy 13 – Expected Profit * Off-Farm Income 
2  3.17e-04**  1.61e-04  3.43e-04**  1.62e-04  1.22e-03*  7.25e-04  1.69e-03***  7.06e-04 
Risk Proxy 14 – Variability of Profit * Off-Farm Inc. 
2  1.65e-04  5.94e-04  1.73e-04  6.11e-04  2.49e-03  2.69e-03  2.87e-03  2.86e-03 
Risk Proxy 15 – Expected Profit * Farm Size 
2  -3.91*  2.23  -3.66*  2.21  16.31*  10.08  13.29  9.66 
Risk Proxy 16 – Variability of Profit * Farm Size 
2  -3.36  11.89  -3.29  12.27  -58.03  53.83  -54.41  56.74 
Area under Nitrate Vulnerable Scheme  3.87e-03  0.01  6.09e-03  0.01  0.01  0.06  0.05  0.07 
Income due to Environmental Stewardship Scheme  -0.96***  0.11  -0.95***  0.12  -7.81e-03***  1.57e-04  -2.39e-03***  1.91e-04 
Constant  -243.71***  8.23  -243.78***  -28.01  -537.79***  37.27  -542.08***  44.22 
R-Square Within  0.9196    0.9201    0.7035    0.7072   
R-Square Between  0.9687    0.9692    0.9495    0.9498   
R-Square Overall  0.9495    0.9494    0.8900    0.8888   
Wald Chi2(52) / Prob > Chi2
  16882.82  (0.000)  15806.82  (0.000)  7258.15  (0.000)  5647.56  (0.000) 
Number of Observations (n)  953    953    953    953   
Number of Groups (n)  570    570    570    570   
Observations per Group (min/avg/max)  1/1.7/3    1/1.7/3    1/1.7/3    1/1.7/3   
rho_ar  ---    0.139    ---    0.469   
modified DW-test  ---    1.784    ---    1.177   
Baltagi-Wu-LBI  ---    2.609    ---    2.208   
Bootstrap Replications  10,000    10,000    10,000    10,000   
1 : Estimates obtained by Generalized Transformation Frontier; 2 : Estimates obtained by Translog Profit Function; 3 : Reference Category „Most of Holding <300m‟; 




                                                 
i However, it has to be stressed that reputational costs may lead to discontinuouities. 
ii Measured magnitudes rage from 8% of water purchase cost for the California Water Bank (Howitt 1994) up to 38% of total costs 
for an agricultural technical assistance program (McCann and Easter 2000). There is also a large literature, following Williamson 
(1985) empirically demonstrating that transaction cost minimization can help explain industry structure and decision making by 
economic agents in the context of market transactions (e.g. Pittman 1991, Leffler and Rucker 1991, Lyons 1994, Moss et al. 2001). 
iii E.g. the analysis by Whitby and Saunders (1996) is not based on a comprehensive multivariate framework whereas the study by 
Falconer et al (2001) does not consider cost factors on farm and farmer level. Quillerou and Fraser (2009) base their regression 
analysis on 46 observations. All of these studies neglect the cost implications of risk related variation in farmers‟ compliance 
behaviour. 
iv Data on compliance rates per region and year was obtained from Natural England (ESS) and the Environment Agency (EA). 
These rates are based on the share of inspection visits with a positive (complying) finding out of all inspection visits in a given 
region and year. 
v The majority of farms are in the sample for 1 to 2 years. We tested for an alternative random effects specification which proved to 
be not significant. Hence, we opted for a pooled cross-section specification of the model. 
vi As the dependent variable varies at regional level and the explanatories vary either at regional or farm level, we also estimated an 
ordered logistic mixed regression by transforming the cost data into categories of ratios using ordinal numbers. However, the 
estimation results showed no significant differences in sign and value with respect to the estimated coefficients, hence, we prefer 
and report the random-effects regression results. We further run separate regressions for compensatory payments and scheme 
transaction costs with respect to the ESS scheme. The estimates were not significantly different from those obtained by the 
combined total cost regressions, hence, we prefer and report the estimation results only for the latter. 
vii The diagnostic measures for the risk related translog profit function estimation as well as the technological transformation 
frontier estimation indicate satisfactory model fits and no severe signs of misspecification. The detailed estimates and model 
statistics for these two estimation steps are not reported here due to space limitations and readability, however, can be obtained 
from the authors upon request. Endogeneity: Potential endogeneity with respect to some explanatory variables in the cost 
regressions is addressed by incorporating also variables for environmental, spatial and socioeconomic characteristics at the stage of 
the estimations of the risk and technological proxies. Hence, the risk and technological estimates used at the stage of the final cost 
regressions are unbiased estimates. Collinearity: Potential collinearity between the different farm related technological variables at 
the stage of the cost regressions has been tested for by additional auxiliary regressions. Hence, we have regressed each explanatory 
on all other explanatories and have critically examined the model significance. However, as the robust farm type indicator variables 
are defined by the survey agency purely on relative output share considerations whereas the elasticity and performance estimates 
are based on multivariate estimations and marginal derivations at the point of optimisation, the probability of potential correlations 
between these regressors are rather low. Finally, such potential misspecifications based on variables correlations are also addressed 
by the mixed-effects modelling set-up. 